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[BMW of North America v. Gore1], I would not join the Court’s
swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to
resemble marching orders.”
—Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg2
“We therefore rely primarily on state courts to fulfill the
constitutional role as primary guarantors of federal rights. But the
state courts must do more than recite the constitutional rule. They
also must apply it, faithful to its letter and cognizant of the principles
underlying it.
Unfortunately, such review is not always
forthcoming.”
—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor3
“Is it up to a state court to sit in judgment about whether our remand
orders are in error or not?”
—Justice Antonin Scalia4
“Is there any way for us to ensure against, in effect, a bad-faith
response [by lower courts] to our decisions?”
—Justice David H. Souter5
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, which evoked exasperation from
Justices Scalia and Souter at its oral arguments, appeared before the U.S.
Supreme Court three times in the past decade.6 The only question under
1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
3. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
4. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 46, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 556 U.S. 178
(2009) (No. 07-1216) [hereinafter Williams III Transcript] (emphasis added) (question of Justice
Scalia to State of Oregon advocate, Robert S. Peck).
5. Id. at 48. (commenting, while mulling over his concern, that the Oregon court’s
persistence in sustaining the punitive damage award given in the earlier Williams II decision may
send a signal encouraging disobedience by other lower courts).
6. In Williams I, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and remanded the case back to the
Oregon courts to consider the possible effects of Campbell, which was decided after the Oregon
Court of Appeals had reached its final decision. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams I),
540 U.S. 801 (2003) (mem.). In Williams II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a
challenged jury instruction that was approved by the Oregon Supreme Court. Philip Morris USA
Inc. v. Williams (Williams II), 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). The jury instruction at issue appeared
to Justice Breyer, writing for a five-to-four majority, to cross the due process line first drawn by
the Court in Gore. Id. at 352 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 547). The Gore decision considered actual
and potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts to persons other than the plaintiff. Id.
at 353.
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consideration in Williams III was the Oregon Supreme Court’s handling of the
remand in Williams II—to correct the constitutionality of a jury instruction
regarding the calculation of a punitive damages award.7 In its decision on
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court did not implement Justice Stephen
Breyer’s seemingly clear directions.8 Instead of correcting the constitutional
error identified, the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the original punitive
damages judgment against Philip Morris on a procedural ground not previously
considered during the appellate review of the case.9 Commenting to the Court
about this surprising development during the December 2008 oral arguments,
Stephen Shapiro, Philip Morris’s attorney, asserted:
We are here today because the Oregon court failed to follow this
Court’s direction on remand and because the ground it gave is not
adequate to show a forfeiture of due process rights . . . . This Court
vacated [Williams II] after finding that the Oregon Supreme Court
applied the wrong constitutional standard, and it remanded with
directions to apply the standard that the Court laid out. But the
Oregon court didn’t do that.
It never even addressed the
constitutional issue.10
Four months later, in a curious and unexplained move, the Court summarily
dismissed Williams III without taking further action, stating only that
“certiorari [had been] improvidently granted.”11
This was not the first time in recent years that the Supreme Court faced
resistance or reluctance by a state supreme court on a remand to fully
implement the Court’s directions to correct punitive damages awards that were
determined to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or excessive. This resistance is

7. Williams II, 549 U.S. at 350–51. As read by Justice Breyer and the majority, the
questionable instruction in Williams II could be reasonably interpreted by a jury to allow the jury
to consider actual and potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts to persons other
than the plaintiff when calculating the size of the punitive damages award necessary to fully
punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing. Id. at 354. Justice Breyer stated that he
thought the Court had clearly ruled in Gore that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
prohibits a state from imposing punishment for harm inflicted upon strangers to the litigation,
thereby rendering constitutionally defective the jury instruction that appeared to permit such
punishment. Id. at 352–53.
8. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc. 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or. 2008), vacated and remanded
by Williams I, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
9. Id. The Oregon court ruled that the jury instruction requested by Philip Morris at the
original trial so badly misstated Oregon law that, under well-settled Oregon precedent, Philip
Morris was barred from appealing the plaintiff’s instruction that was actually given to the jury
and which formed the basis for the Supreme Court review sought by Philip Morris in Williams II.
Id. at 1263–64.
10. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 3.
11. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams III), 556 U.S. 178 (2009) (per curiam);
see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Withdraws in Tobacco Case, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at
B2.
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also evident in the aftermath of both BMW of North America v. Gore12 and
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance Co.,13 two leading cases
on punitive damages decided before Williams II. In these two cases, the Court
most fully developed the framework for applying the “fair notice” principle,
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to review
punitive damages awards.14
Of the nine punitive damages cases the Court has decided in the past
twenty-five years, only Gore and Campbell were vacated because the Supreme
Court found the state courts’ decisions in violation of evolving substantive due
process jurisprudence as applied directly to the size of punitive damages
awards.15 In both cases, on remand, the state supreme courts only partially
complied with the Court’s orders and also failed to fully apply the Court’s
suggested analysis.16 In Gore, on remand, the Alabama Supreme Court
ignored the suggestion that punitive damages awards over four times the
compensatory damages were excessive.17 Although the Alabama Supreme
Court did reduce the punitive damages award, it did so to a figure twelve and
one-half times the compensatory award.18 The defendant, BMW, did not seek
further judicial review of the reduced award.19

12. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1997). Gore was the first case in
which the Court applied its substantive due process analysis to hold a state punitive damage
award excessive ($4 million punitive damages for $4000 compensatory damages). BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 509 (1996). On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced
its original punitive damages award from $4 million to $50,000. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515. By
setting the corrected punitive award at over twelve times the compensatory damages, however,
the Alabama Supreme Court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s recommendation that punitive
damages should not exceed a single digit ratio in relation to the compensatory damages, with a
preference for four-to-one ratios. Gore, 517 U.S. at 581. No further review of the Alabama
decision was sought by the defendant. Id.
13. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004). In Campbell, the
Court remanded to the Utah Supreme Court a $145 million punitive damages award it determined
to be flawed on several counts, and almost certainly unconstitutionally excessive. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003). On remand, the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed each of the issues identified in the Supreme Court’s opinion as problematic and
reaffirmed its earlier decision with respect to the correctness of its rulings under Utah law.
Campbell, 98 P.3d at 412. The Utah court reduced the size of the punitive damages award from
$145 million to just over $9 million. Id. at 410. This adjusted punitive award was still nine times
the compensatory damages awarded in the case, notwithstanding the view expressed by the
Supreme Court that any punitive damages award larger than a one-to-one ratio might be excessive
on the facts of the case. Id. at 410–12. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied certiorari when
review was sought a second time by the defendant. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
543 U.S. 874 (2004).
14. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417–18; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–86.
15. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429; Gore, 517 U.S. at 585–86.
16. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515; Campbell, 98 P.3d at 410–12.
17. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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In Campbell, Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected a punitive damages award
of $145 million as grossly excessive, stating that the proper punitive damages
award should be near the $1 million in compensatory damages
awarded—a one-to-one ratio.20 On remand, the Utah Supreme Court rejected
State Farm’s argument that the Supreme Court “mandate[ed]” a punitive
damages award no higher than the compensatory damages and only reduced
the award to $9 million.21 This award had a nine-to-one ratio between the
punitive and compensatory damages and thus was the greatest possible ratio
within the Court’s preferred single-digit ratio framework.22 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari when State Farm sought further review.23
This history provides a context for the concern that the lower courts might
be misapplying or failing to apply Supreme Court precedent governing
punitive damages. This concern was highlighted during the Williams III oral
argument, when Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that, if there was
something “malodorous” about how Oregon handled the remand in Williams
II, perhaps articulating a clear standard regarding the proper ratio might help
ease this concern and “protect [the Court’s] constitutional authority” in
excessive punitive damages claims.24 The Justices, particularly Chief Justice
Roberts, seem concerned that the Oregon court’s rejection of their analysis in
Williams II, on remand, may be symptomatic of other courts ignoring or
misapplying Supreme Court precedent governing punitive damages.25
The Court’s continued reluctance to establish a clear, bright-line rule for
determining excessiveness in punitive damages awards draws attention to the
question: Why did the Court grant certiorari in Williams II to review only the
technical correctness of the jury instruction about possible punitive damages,
when the relationship between the punitive damages award and the
compensatory damages was ninety seven-to-one, far larger than what the Court

20. Campbell, 438 U.S. at 425.
21. Campbell, 98 P.3d at 413.
22. Id.
23. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 543 U.S. 874 (2004).
24. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 51–52; see also id. at 55 (statement of Justice
Berger, acknowledging that Chief Justice Roberts did, in fact, suggest “that maybe [the Court]
should reach the issue of due process on the amount?”).
25. See id. at 52–55. Professor Catherine M. Sharkey has discussed the problems of state
recognition of Supreme Court precedent by noting the dissonance between the Court’s recent due
process jurisprudence as applied to punitive damages awards, and its repeated recognition that, as
a matter of policy, questions regarding when such damages are permissible are primarily matters
for the states. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages
in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 449–50 (2010).
Professor Sharkey’s article outlined several strategies that state courts or state legislatures could
follow if they wished to exert greater resistance to the Supreme Court’s federalization of these
issues. Id. at 464–77.
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previously suggested to be constitutionally permissible?26 One possible
explanation is that the Supreme Court assumed that overturning the decision on
26. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 351 (2007). There is rich scholarly literature discussing the
Supreme Court’s recent applications of due process principles to limit punitive damages awards.
For an example of the discussion before 2004, see Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on
Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 779–87
(2004). Since 2004, scholarly intrigue and discussion has grown continuously. See, e.g., Michael
P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1 (2004) (explaining the wide range of methods and reasoning that have been used by the Court to
invalidate awards of punitive damages and the potential for confusion they present); Melissa
Michelle Davis, Procedural Protections in Punitive Damage Cases: Ensuring that Juries Are
Asking the Right Questions About Wealth Evidence, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1119, 1120–27 (2008)
(emphasizing the importance of jury instructions and how due process may be satisfied even in
the cases of high punitive damages as long as proper procedures are maintained and followed to
assure consistent and fair results); Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Constitution, 70 LA. L. REV. 421, 422–24 (2010) (describing the uncertainty that surrounds
punitive damages due to unclear and conflicting jurisprudence); Anthony J. Franze, Clinging to
Federalism: How Reluctance to Amend State-Based Punitive Damages Procedures Impedes Due
Process, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 297, 299–302 (2008) (describing the discrepancies between
states’ jury instructions and the Court’s guidance on constitutional limits on punitive damages and
the need to improve the jury instructions); F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on
Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without Technique?”, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 350–54, 356
(2008) (citing inconsistencies in punitive damages jurisprudence as complicating their use and the
problems that arise from awarding punitive damages based on harm to a third party); Jenny Miao
Jiang, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, and
Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 793, 796–98, 828–29
(2006) (describing how the Court found that punitive damages fall under the Due Process Clause
and arguing that the Court should focus on guaranteeing procedural due process rather than
invalidating specific amounts of punitive damages as being too excessive); Alexandra B. Klass,
Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 95, 141–43 (2007) (arguing that the
Court’s restriction of punitive damages to single-digit ratios may inhibit a court’s ability to
account for unvalued harm that has occurred); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of
Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 251, 327–29 (2009)
(detailing a framework for the implementation of punitive damages based on the Court’s past
rulings); Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm,
56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2008) (arguing that high punitive damages awards will cause
businesses to account for the risk of them being imposed through raising prices and other
methods, which could have detrimental effects for the company); Doug Rendleman, A Plea to
Reject the United States Supreme Court’s Due-Process Review of Punitive Damages, in THE LAW
OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW 540–41 (Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood
eds., 2010) (describing the differing opinions between the Justices as to what “grossly excessive”
means); Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Road Not Taken: Would Application of the Excessive Fines
Clause to Punitive Damages Have Made a Difference?, 17 WIDENER L.J. 949, 959–60 (2008)
(arguing that the State’s punitive damages framework should assure that juries do not seek to
punish a defendant for harm done to strangers); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From
Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 959, 973 (2007) (describing the Court’s efforts to assure
that punitive damages are not excessive, but also to assure that they are not awarded in an
arbitrary manner that could threaten the established tort system); Sharkey, supra note 25, at
449–51 (describing issues that have arisen out of the Court’s holdings in punitive damages cases);
A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness
Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1123–24 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s use of due
process to invalidate punitive damages awards improperly expands the Due Process Clause);
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the basis of a faulty jury instruction would require a new trial, which would
yield a new punitive damages award and make it unnecessary to review the
Chief Justice Roberts, however,
original award for excessiveness.27
characterized the limited grant of certiorari as an indication of the Court
pointedly avoiding the excessiveness issue,28 which heightened scholarly
curiosity regarding the Court’s seeming indifference toward an arguably

Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 73, 92–97 (2007) (describing the Court’s use of procedural and substantive due
process to invalidate excessive punitive damages claims); James M. Underwood, Road to
Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn? The Intersection of Punitive Damages Class Actions and
the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 763, 763–68 (2009) (describing the Court’s
initial reluctance to prohibit punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to third parties);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757,
1758–59 (2012) (describing the tensions between the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Oregon in deciding the issue of constitutional limits on punitive damages); Michael I. Krauss,
Response: “Retributive Damages” and the Death of Private Ordering, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 167, 168 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02–2010/Krauss.pdf
(describing the issues that have arisen from punitive damages jurisprudence); Dan Marke, Reply,
Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 283, 284
(2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/Markel.pdf (describing punitive damages
frameworks that states may adopt to meet constitutional requirements); David G. Owen,
Response, Aggravating Punitive Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 181, 182 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2010/Owen.pdf (describing the issues that arise for
litigants in cases that involve punitive damages due to the uncertainty punitive damage litigation
has caused).
27. This strategy was already employed by the Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., in which a procedural irregularity required remand and rendered it
unnecessary to rule on the excessiveness claim based on a ninety-to-one ratio between punitive
damages and compensatory damages. 532 U.S. 424, 441 (2001).
28. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 51–51. The Oregon court awarded $821,000 in
compensatory and $79.5 million in punitive damages. Williams v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 127
P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006). In its earlier punitive damages cases, the Supreme Court articulated
the constitutional limits that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes on the
size of punitive damages awards. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568–70 (1996). In Gore and Campbell, the
Court promulgated the three guideposts for lower courts to apply in reviewing potentially
excessive punitive damages awards and to justify punitive damages: (1) the defendant’s conduct
must be “reprehensible;” (2) the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages must
be reasonable; and (3) where relevant, the civil fine or criminal penalty for comparable conduct
should be used as a benchmark. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75. The
second guidepost concerning the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages has
received the most attention by the Court. See Michael P. Allen, Of Remedies, Juries, and State
Regulation of Punitive Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 343, 349 (2008). In Exxon, although due process jurisprudence was discussed
favorably, it was not entirely useful in determining the acceptable size of the punitive damages
award, which was reduced from $2 billion to $500 million—achieving a one-to-one ratio. Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481, 513–15 (2008).
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excessive award and its reluctance to apply its new due process
jurisprudence.29
Compounding the puzzle was the Court’s summary dismissal of Williams III
several months after oral arguments, stating that certiorari had been
“improvidently granted” as the only explanation.30 One potential explanation
for the summary dismissal is that the Supreme Court recognized that, rather
than exhibiting an unwillingness to follow precedent, the Oregon court was
merely exercising its authority in supervising its own procedural domain and
would provide a proper jury instruction henceforth. Later Oregon cases are
consistent with this explanation and appear to demonstrate subsequent
compliance with Supreme Court precedent.31 If this “no harm, no foul”
explanation is correct, once the Court decided not to send the jury instruction
back to the Oregon court again, why did it not extend its original grant of
certiorari to include the excessiveness issue? Perhaps the Justices preferred
waiting for a case with less egregious facts to fine-tune Guidepost 2.
Another possible explanation of the summary dismissal advanced by one
scholar is that it signaled the Supreme Court’s retreat from its close oversight
of state punitive damages awards.32 This interpretation of Williams III appears
difficult to sustain, however, in light of the Court’s response to the punitive
damages issue in Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker, a high-profile 2008
multi-billion dollar admiralty case arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in

29. Williams II evoked a significant amount of scholarly writing addressing the procedural
and evidentiary questions raised. See generally Symposium Edition, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1
(2008) (containing nine articles addressing punitive damages). See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby,
Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive
Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 407–08 (2008) (speculating that when the Williams Court claimed
it was relying on procedural due process, it it was serious because the argument for substantive
due process was untenable); Davis, supra note 26 (reasoning that the outcome of Williams may
have been the result of the Supreme Court’s interest in cleaning up procedural improprieties
rather than refining its excessiveness review); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel,
Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse Bifurcation”
Approach to Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 398–401 (2008); Sharkey, supra
note 25, at 461–62, 464 (suggesting that Williams demonstrates the limitations of the Supreme
Court’s authority and capacity within the state law realm of punitive damages but also perhaps the
empowerment of state court defiance).
30. Williams III, 556 U.S. 178, 179 (2009) (per curiam); see also Sharkey, supra note 25, at
450 n.3 (noting that the Supreme Court does not usually provide reasons for dismissal).
31. See Joseph J. Solberg & Karen A. Hosack, Punitive Damages After Philip Morris USA
v. Williams: Has the Smoke Cleared? 18 J. L. BUS. & ETHICS 73, 74, 87–89 (2012) (noting that
the Oregon Court of Appeals reined in jury-awarded punitive damages with ratios in excess of the
Supreme Court’s guidance, but the Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the arguably excessive
award in Hamlin (citing Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 246 P.3d 1121 (2011); Goddard
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 179 P.3d 645, 670 (2008))).
32. See generally Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts out of
Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525 (2011).
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Alaska.33 In Exxon, despite favorably discussing its recent due process
jurisprudence, the Court recognized the availability of punitive damages in
admiralty cases and articulated a new federal norm of a presumptive
one-to-one ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.34
Considering the concerns expressed by the Justices regarding whether state
courts are failing to follow the Supreme Court’s punitive damages directions,
the question arises: Is recalcitrance to implement Supreme Court guidance an
aberration among lower courts or is it relatively commonplace? Based on an
extensive study of over five hundred reported cases reviewing punitive
damages awards published since Campbell in 2003, this Article concludes that
lower courts’ “faithfulness” to their constitutional obligations in accepting and
applying the three Gore/Campbell guideposts35 is not cause for concern.
This Article focuses primarily on the issue of lower courts’ faithfulness to
the Supreme Court’s directions as to how constitutional review of punitive
damages awards should be conducted. Part I briefly traces the history of the
Supreme Court’s “federalization”36 of punitive damages law under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause through the establishment of
three constitutional guideposts for lower courts to follow. Part II explores how
these guideposts should work by applying them to a hypothetical case against
oil industry defendants involved in the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe. Part
III then considers whether there is a conventional legal understanding of lower
courts’ obligations when they hear cases on remand. Part IV outlines the
methodology employed to identify, classify, and analyze the punitive damages
cases decided by lower courts since the Campbell decision. This Article
reports the results of a detailed examination of cases involving punitive
damages claims decided since 2003, looking for evidence of whether lower
courts are ignoring, resisting, or even chaffing under the new constitutional
guideposts they are expected to follow. Finally, Part V asserts that lower
courts are obediently following the Supreme Court’s “marching orders”37
through their own interpretations and applications of the relevant guideposts.
In short, the concerns raised in Williams III about the faithfulness of lower

33. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476, 515 (2008); see also Joni Hersch
& W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 259, 259–60 (2010).
34. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 480–81 (noting that the Ninth Circuit reduced the
plaintiff’s punitive damages award from $4 billion to $2.5 billion); see also In re the Exxon
Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by and reh’g en banc denied, 490 F.3d 1066
(9th Cir. 2007).
35. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
36. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalism, 53 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1353, 1420 (2006).
37. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (providing that the term “marching orders” was first used somewhat disparagingly by
Justice Ginsburg).
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courts to the Supreme Court’s emerging punitive damages jurisprudence are
not justified by how those courts are actually deciding punitive damages cases.
I. EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GOVERNING CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS FOR ARBITRARINESS OR EXCESSIVENESS
Although based on remedial considerations different from those that animate
most of Anglo-American tort law, punitive damages, in some form, have been
a part of the United States’ common law heritage for centuries. The English
origins of punitive damages law have been well documented by judges and
scholars.38 Initially, some U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize claims for
punitive damages when first encountered, but in the 1854 case of Day v.
Woodworth, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff’s entitlement to
a jury award for punitive damages to punish unusually aggravated wrongdoing
by a defendant was “well established” in American common law.39
Throughout the next century, most U.S. courts allowed juries wide discretion
in determining whether punitive damages were justified and in fixing the
amount of the punitive damages award necessary to punish the defendant and
deter future bad conduct. During this period, judicial review of jury awards of
punitive damages was highly deferential. Awards were set aside only if they
were clearly the product of “prejudice, passion, or bias” on the part of the jury,
or if the award “lacked evidentiary support or . . . shocked the . . . conscience”
of the reviewing court.40

38. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 522 (4th ed. 1868) (demonstrating
that English cases in the eighteenth century that awarded private plaintiffs money beyond what
they could prove as compensatory damages denoted these extra damages as “exemplary”). These
early cases often involved private actions against governmental actors who had exceeded their
authority. See J. G. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 758 (1883). As the recognition of the
possible availability of punitive damages migrated to America, the typical early case involved a
different type of abuse of power, namely outrageous social or economic conduct deliberately
intended to harm and humiliate the plaintiff. Id. at 726. A few state courts refused to recognize
the availability of a claim for exemplary damages, the legitimacy of which was subject to
vigorous debate among tort scholars. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 125–26 (Colo. 1884);
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). The availability of punitive damages in the proper case
appeared increasingly well settled by the middle of the nineteenth century. See also Barry v.
Edmonds, 116 U.S. 550, 563 (1886) (noting the virtually unfettered discretion of juries to award
punitive damages). During this time period, American punitive damages cases most often
involved railroads and other common carriers, whose employees egregiously harmed customers.
See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522–23 (1885). In the early twentieth century,
the reach of punitive damages awards was extended to egregiously fraudulent conduct in business
dealings and other personal wrongs reflecting particularly reprehensible conduct by the
defendant. See 1 DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(10) n.5 (2d ed. 1993).
39. 54 U.S. (12 How.) 363, 371 (1854) (stating that a plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive
damages for unusually aggravated conduct by a defendant was “well established” in American
law).
40. James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damage Awards—An Expended Judicial Role, 72 MARQ. L.
REV. 33, 35–36 (1988).
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This began to change in the latter half of the twentieth century. Beginning in
the 1960s, a few lower federal court opinions expressed serious concerns about
the undisciplined nature and exploding size of punitive damages awards.41 In
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court, while continuing to rule that
punitive damages awards generally were not subject to constitutional scrutiny
by federal courts, nevertheless held that punitive damages’ unpredictability
rendered them inappropriate in cases in which First Amendment rights were at
issue,42 and in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against city officials.43 In a
seminal 1982 article,44 Professor Dorsey Ellis observed that the incidence of
large punitive damages awards was rising rapidly and questioned whether such
awards were the best way for society to regulate egregious misbehavior by
tortfeasors.45 Because of the escalating rate of punitive damages awards, Ellis
also raised doubts that would-be tortfeasors were afforded fair notice of the
severe consequences of losing a lawsuit alleging their misbehavior.46 Later in
the 1980s, several legal scholars began building arguments to constrain or
eliminate punitive damages as a remedy.47
A. Early Supreme Court Discourse: Addressing State Courts’ Punitive
Damages Awards Practice
The first hint that the Supreme Court might be open to considering
constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards appeared in a 1986
decision in which the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was used
to challenge an Alabama Supreme Court Justice’s refusal to recuse himself
when he stood to obtain a financial gain depending on the outcome of the
case.48 In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, the plaintiffs raised other
41. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839–41 (2d. Cir. 1967);
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 737 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, J., dissenting).
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50, 367 (1974).
43. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1981).
44. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
45. Id. at 2, 53.
46. Ellis focused his concern on two different issues. First, he challenged the economic
efficiency of private law enforcement through punitive damages. Id. at 31. Second, he raised a
fairness issue: given the extreme unpredictability of punitive damages awards, can wrongdoers be
fairly said to be on notice about the possible drastic financial consequences of their harmful
actions? Id. at 22. On this latter point, Ellis anticipated, by almost a decade, the start of the
Supreme Court giving attention to the “fair notice” element of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and its procedural and substantive implications regarding the need to rein in
punitive damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive. Id. at 53.
47. See John Calvin Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (1986); see also David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 CHI. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1982); James B. Sales
& Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 1117, 1157 (1984).
48. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 375 U.S. 813, 815 (1986).

382

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:371

constitutional challenges to the amount of punitive damages awarded in
addition to the recusal for bias claim.49 The Court declined to address both the
defendant’s Eighth Amendment excessive fine claim and the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process claim; however, Chief Justice Warren Berger
expressly stated that both raised “important issues which, in an appropriate
setting, must be resolved.”50
It did not take long for the appropriate setting to arise. Although several
justices played key roles over the next two decades in expanding the scope of
the Due Process Clause to encompass problematic punitive damages awards,
Justice O’Connor was the most relentless champion of the enterprise.51 When
Justice O’Connor retired from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005, she left a
lasting mark on constitutional law in several important fields. In describing
her legacy, however, few scholars highlighted her successful campaign to
subject punitive damages awards to searching constitutional scrutiny, both
procedurally and substantively. Thanks to Justice O’Connor, the Supreme
Court ultimately developed a new and controversial set of constitutional
standards applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to
evaluate possible unreasonableness or excessiveness of punitive damages
awards.52
49. Id. at 828.
50. Id. at 828–29.
51. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (flagging, for future consideration, the idea that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment might impose constitutional limits on the unreasonableness or
excessiveness of punitive damages awards). Justice O’Connor was persistent about applying
constitutional standards to punitive damages awards. One year later, in another dissent in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., Justice O’Connor emphasized
Professor Ellis’s assessment of the burgeoning problem by asserting that punitive damages
awards were “skyrocketing” and that the threat of enormous punitive awards acted as a damper on
the research and development of new products. 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor argued unsuccessfully that the “excessive fines” provision
of the Eighth Amendment should operate through the Fourteenth Amendment to impose a
substantive ceiling on state punitive damages awards. Id. at 300. Justice O’Connor also renewed
her call for applying procedural due process to the seemingly unregulated discretion granted to
juries under the traditional common law process for determining both the appropriateness and size
of punitive damages awards. Id. at 283. She justified her position by asserting that inherent in
the concept of due process was the proposition that defendants were entitled to fair notice with
respect to the probable consequences of their wrongdoing, and that because punitive damages
were a form of civil penalty, the idea that the punishment should fit the wrong was applicable. Id.
at 297. In discussing these issues, Justice O’Connor foreshadowed, by seven years, the eventual
adoption by the Court of formal constitutional guideposts to assist lower courts in their review of
jury awards of punitive damages. Id. at 300–01.
52. Justice O’Connor’s ideas about due process imposing outside limits on punitive
damages were first officially embraced by the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The majority opinion expressly endorsed the application of both
procedural and substantive due process to jury awards of punitive damages, but nevertheless
found that the traditional common law process used in Alabama met procedural due process
standards because it was subjected to careful review by both the trial judge and the appellate

2013]

Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts

383

In the view of some constitutional scholars, the Court completely
“federalized” the common law governing punitive damages in a series of
decisions in which it invoked the principle of “fair notice,” found embedded in
the Due Process Clause.53 Applying procedural due process principles, the
Court first required all states to provide meaningful opportunities for rigorous
judicial review of punitive damages.54 The Court later extended this reasoning
by requiring de novo review of the reasonableness of punitive damages
awards.55 In a 2007 ruling, oddly characterized as procedural, the Court
required that jury instructions confine the jury’s deliberations to the plaintiff
alone and not to strangers to the litigation when considering the appropriate
punitive damages size.56 This new application of procedural due process
principles to punitive damages is uncontroversial, except for several opponents
who claim that it intrudes too greatly into the legitimate interests of the states
to shape their laws and processes.57 Justice O’Connor’s campaign to impose
both procedural and substantive constitutional limits on punitive damages
continued in her dissent two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.58
court. Id. at 19–24. The majority also found that the punitive damages award, which was over
four times the compensatory damages award, was not unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 23.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent was lengthy and strongly worded. Id. at 42–54 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that the award was “close to the line” but did not lack objective criteria).
O’Connor noted that excessive punitive damages awards “have a devastating potential for harm.”
Id. at 42. She characterized the traditional common law deference to jury decision-making as so
unprincipled as to be unconstitutionally “void for vagueness.” Id. at 43. Justice O’Connor also
renewed her insistence that the Court should set forth constitutional “guideposts” to assist lower
courts in their decision-making regarding whether to award punitive damages and the appropriate
size of awards. Id. at 57.
53. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 36, at 1420.
54. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20–22.
55. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001).
56. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007).
57. Id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should “accord more
respectful treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought diligently to
adhere to [the Court’s] changing, less than crystalline precedent”); see also, e.g., Franze, supra
note 26, at 302; Sharkey, supra note 25, at 477–78.
58. 509 U.S. 443, 480 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The TXO majority agreed that due
process standards based on fair notice applied to both the process by which punitive damages
were awarded and the size of the award made. Id. at 458 (majority opinion). The plurality
opinion, however, found that the traditional jury process was satisfactory under procedural due
process norms and also held that the award, which was 526 times the size of the compensatory
award, was not unconstitutionally excessive because the defendant’s wrong raised the potential
for great harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 460–62. Although Justice O’Connor agreed with the
majority’s principle, she condemned the traditional common law deference to the jury as
standardless and argued that the award at issue was grossly excessive because there was no
evidence in the record supporting the potential harm analysis. Id. at 484–86 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
One year later, in Honda Motor Co. LTD. v. Oberg, the Supreme Court finally applied the
procedural due process analysis long advocated by Justice O’Connor to strike down an Oregon
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B. The Three Guideposts: Due Process and Punitive Damages
Despite repeated dissents, the Supreme Court ultimately extended the due
process principle of fair notice to the size of punitive damages awards.59 This
extension of substantive due process is based on the argument that even the
most egregious tortfeasors should not be unfairly surprised by the size of
punitive damages awards.60 Since 1996, the Court has utilized this fair notice
analysis with respect to both deservedness and the possible excessiveness of
awards.61 To guide lower courts in implementing the newly imposed
constitutional responsibility to review punitive damages awards, the Court
established three guideposts in Gore62 and further refined them in Campbell.63
Justice Kennedy recited the three guideposts as follows: “(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual
court’s punitive damages decision on the basis that Oregon law prevented state courts from
conducting a meaningful review of jury punitive damages awards. 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).
Justice O’Connor joined Justice Stevens’s majority opinion and did not write separately. Id. at
416–17. The concept of a constitutionally mandated meaningful review of punitive damages
awards was expanded in a later case also involving Oregon’s law. See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532
U.S. at 436. In this case, the Court remanded a punitive damages award ninety times the
compensatory award because of a procedural defect—a lack of de novo review of the jury award
by an appellate court. Id. The Court did not reach the excessiveness issue because the necessity
of de novo review meant that the award was not final. Id. at 435. Justice O’Connor again joined
the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens and did not write separately. Id. at 425.
59. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996).
60. Id. In 1996, the Court struck down an Alabama court’s award of punitive damages on
the grounds that the size of the award was unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of substantive
due process. Id. at 585–86. In Gore, the punitive damages award to the plaintiff was 500 times
the compensatory damages, but the defendant’s misconduct was far from egregious and inflicted
only minor economic harm. Id. at 574–75. The Supreme Court also found fault with the
Alabama trial process, which allowed the jury to consider the defendant’s legal business practices
in other states with alleged out-of-state victims who were not parties to the litigation in Alabama.
Id. at 572–73; see also Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007) (holding a similar procedural
fault as the basis of remand to the Oregon courts after the jury appeared to consider harm done to
non-plaintiff parties in determining the size of the appropriate punitive damages award). Justice
O’Connor joined the majority opinion in Gore and also Justice Breyer’s concurrence, arguing that
the Alabama jury process was subject to other more serious deficiencies overlooked by the
majority. Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he standards the
Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary
results”). For the first time, the Court accepted Justice O’Connor’s plea to provide greater
instruction to lower courts by adopting three guideposts for reviewing punitive damages decisions
challenged as unconstitutionally unreasonable or excessive. Id. at 574–75. The guideposts,
however, were not concrete rules to be strictly applied, but were rather general principles for the
lower courts to adapt to the facts of individual cases. Id. at 585–86. Dissenters on the Court and
tort scholars scoffed at the guideposts as an unprincipled incursion into the legitimate realm of
state decision-making that lower courts would find very difficult to implement. See, e.g., id. at
605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere” and provide no
real guidance).
61. Dupree, supra note 26, at 421.
62. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–83.
63. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418–28 (2003).
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or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and
(3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”64 The guideposts
aim to assure, through “[e]xacting appellate review[,] . . . that an award of
punitive damages is based upon an ‘application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker’s caprice.’”65
Williams II did not involve interpretation or application of the guideposts.66
The holding was narrow and explicitly deemed procedural by Justice Breyer,
thus reinforcing the principle that a jury may not constitutionally take into
account harm to strangers to the litigation when calculating punitive damages
awards.67 This holding drew a fine line, however, because the Supreme Court
concedes that the defendant’s misconduct, which harms others within the state,
may be taken into account by the jury when considering awarding punitive
damages based on the defendant’s degree of reprehensibility.68
C. Punitive Damages and the Unconstitutionally Excessive Standard
The court’s decision in Exxon regarding excessive punitive damages is
difficult to reconcile with the rest of its due process analysis.69 Exercising
original jurisdiction over admiralty law cases, the Supreme Court surprised tort
lawyers and scholars by upholding the Ninth Circuit’s four-to-four decision to
The Court created new federal admiralty
allow punitive damages.70
jurisprudence on punitive damages excessiveness by upholding—but
64. Id. at 418. Seven years after Gore, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Campbell,
which involved a punitive damages award of $145 million. Id. at 412. Expectations were raised
that the Court would elaborate and refine the guideposts to provide greater direction to lower
courts. The decision in Campbell did not fulfill these expectations to any substantial degree. See
Lauren R. Goldman & Nickolai G. Levin, State Farm at Three: Lower Courts’ Application of the
Ratio Guidepost, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 509, 549 (2006) (noting that “many courts . . . resist fully
implementing State Farm’s guidance” while others have “virtually ignored” the decision). The
six-to-three decision, in which Justice O’Connor joined the majority, vacated the Utah court’s
decision and remanded it for reconsideration, but stated that the case was easy to decide in favor
of the defendant by applying the guideposts because the punitive damages award was so grossly
excessive. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429. Thus, the decision did not provide an extended analysis of
how the guideposts clarified that the Utah court’s decision was unconstitutional. The majority
opinion minimally expanded the reprehensibility factor, the ratio norms, and how substantial
variance from these norms would appear. Id. at 419–28. The Court also said little about the
comparability to sanctions for similar offenses, other than observing that criminal punishments
were of limited relevance. Id. at 428. As elaborated in the Campbell opinion, the three
guideposts set forth in Gore are intended to be operative tests for constitutional review of punitive
damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive. Id. at 422.
65. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
66. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
67. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007).
68. Id. at 357.
69. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
70. Id. at 475–76, 486.
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lowering—the original award by eighty percent.71 Justice Souter, writing for
the majority, approvingly described the evolution of the Court’s due process
tests, emphasizing the second guidepost—ratio—but declining to apply such
analysis in Exxon.72 Justice Souter instead chose to develop new federal
admiralty standards limiting the size of punitive damages when large
compensatory damages have already been awarded.73 In applying these new
principles to Exxon, Justice Souter lowered the punitive damages award to a
one-to-one ratio, suggesting that this should be the norm in all cases with very
large compensatory damage awards.74
Justice O’Connor’s drive for increasingly aggressive Supreme Court review
of state punitive damages awards has never commanded decisive majorities in
cases in which her views prevailed;75 the Court is almost always closely
divided on these issues.76 Justice Scalia has strenuously resisted using the Due
Process Clause to prescribe the size of state court punitive damages awards
since first broaching the issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.77
Justice Clarence Thomas later joined Justice Scalia in his position.78 Their
repeated objections rest on the ground that elected legislatures, not the
judiciary, should establish new due process protections.79 The historical
argument is that the common law processes for jury determination of punitive
damages were already well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted in 1868.80 Thus, the dissenters argue that constitutionally limiting
punitive damages with the Due Process Clause would be an impermissible

71. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 33, at 259–61.
72. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 501–02.
73. Id. at 512–15.
74. Id. at 513–15.
75. Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 U. MICH. L.
REV. 33, 46 (2012) (noting Justice O’Connor’s criticism of punitive damages,
“advocat[ing] . . . strict constraints, and [crafting] forceful dissents in Browning-Ferris, Haslip,
and TXO [that] may have influenced her colleagues and the Court’s later thinking”).
76. The landmark Gore decision was decided by a five-to-four margin. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 561 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 411 (2003) (six-to-three decision); Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007) (five-to-four
decision). Although only tangentially related, Exxon Valdez was four-to-four. Exxon, 554 U.S. at
474.
77. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24–28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that the Due Process Clause cannot logically be applied to a common law
practice that antedated the Fourteenth Amendment).
78. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (disclosing Justice Thomas’s first instance of joining Justice Scalia disputing the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment is a “secret repository” of all sorts of substantive
rights).
79. See RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION
166–67 (2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s belief that the elected branches of government should
expand due process rights, not the judiciary).
80. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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federal reform of what was considered an adequate judicial process prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s passage.81 In later cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Ginsburg joined Justices Scalia and Thomas as dissenters, albeit on
different grounds,82 and Justice Stevens joined the dissent in Williams II.83
Justices Ginsberg and Stevens consistently emphasize what they characterize
as unjustified incursions into state prerogatives, which violate basic federalism
principles.84
Even in cases holding punitive damages awards unconstitutionally
excessive, the Supreme Court was careful to observe that legitimate state
interests exist to justify the imposition of punitive damages in proper cases to
punish and deter egregious conduct on the part of defendants.85 Although the
Court has repeatedly mentioned only the two traditional tort law justifications
for punitive damages—retribution and deterrence86—tort scholars87 and some
lower court judges have questioned whether punishment and deterrence
exhaust the legitimate state interests behind the imposition of punitive
damages.88 For example, Professor Dorsey Ellis, Jr. advanced seven legal
reasons that might justify the imposition of punitive damages in a particular
case,89 but confirmed that punishment and deterrence were the fundamental
purposes.90 Judge Richard Posner, in a widely cited 2003 opinion known

81. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Due
Process Clause’s “function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular
measures of reform”).
82. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
83. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
improperly limited the State’s power to punish civil litigants for harms caused to non-parties).
84. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating that an award of
punitive damages at the “discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for
‘reasonableness,’” in state court is sufficient due process because “there is no federal guarantee a
damages award actually be reasonable”).
85. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (stating that
“‘[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition’” (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 568)).
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Christopher J. Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages?, 2
CHARLESTON L. REV. 327, 327 (2008) (dismissing the promotion of peace through punitive
damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 945–46 (1998) (noting that punitive damages may encourage market
transactions to avoid potential litigation).
88. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
89. Ellis, supra note 44, at 3. Professor Ellis enumerated the seven grounds as the
following: “(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense;
(3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private
law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying
the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.” Id.
90. Id. at 11.
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among tort scholars as the “bedbug case,”91 set forth a broader “law and
economics” rationale for imposing punitive damages.92 Posner suggested that
punitive damages may be necessary to provide a needed incentive to litigate
when the harm done to multiple plaintiffs is too difficult to detect, too widely
distributed, or compensatory damages are likely to be too small to justify any
single plaintiff bringing an action.93 Judge Posner suggested that punitive
damages awards may also help to prevent wealthy and determined tortfeasors
from profiting from their ability to escape detection.94 The Supreme Court has
not accepted any of these alternative rationales for punitive damages; instead,
the Court has repeatedly emphasized the state’s interests in punishment and
deterrence as the operative justifications.95
II. APPLYING THE THREE GUIDEPOSTS TO A HYPOTHETICAL SUIT AGAINST OIL
INDUSTRY DEFENDANTS INVOLVED IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
The infamous April 2010 Deepwater Horizon catastrophe at the Macondo
Well in the Gulf of Mexico96 presents a rich opportunity to illustrate how
Gore’s three guideposts might be applied to an appellate court’s review of a
jury’s large punitive damages award against British Petroleum (BP) or against
one or more of the three other oil industry companies who contracted with BP
for drilling the Macondo Well.97 The companies may be sued for the wrongful

91. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 347 F.3d. 672 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Colleen P.
Murphy, The “Bedbug” Case and State Farm v. Campbell, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 579,
581 (2004) (referring to the decision as the “Bedbug” case).
92. See Allen, supra note 28, at 366–67 (using the “Bedbug” decision as an example of “law
and economics”).
93. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677.
94. Id.
95. Recognizing that the membership of the Supreme Court has changed substantially with
the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the retirements of Justices O’Connor, Souter,
and Stevens, the durability of these new constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards is
questionable. It is noteworthy that during their first three court terms together, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito often voted in majority opinions in the few decisions in which the court
favored business interests by overturning longstanding precedents for the newer punitive damages
jurisprudence, including joining Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams II. See Williams II,
549 U.S. 346, 398 (2007). Neither Justice Sonia Sotomayor nor Justice Elena Kagan have
developed a judicial track record on their views about the application of due process standards to
evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damages awards. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in
her Campbell dissent, this new interpretation of the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause rests “on ground not long held.” State Farm Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 411 (2003). The uncertainty about the newer Justices’ approaches to the crucial issue
of unconstitutionally excessive ratios may also partially explain the abrupt dismissal of Williams
III after it was argued.
96. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Reconceptualizing the BP Oil Spill as Parens
Patriae Products Liability, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 291, 294 (2012).
97. Such an award could also be against one of the other three oil industry companies most
directly involved: Halliburton, Transocean, and Cameron International. See id. at 299–300.
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death of the eleven workers killed or for the environmental and economic harm
caused by the devastating pollution of the Gulf.98
A. The First Guidepost: Reprehensibility of the Wrong
Assuming the allegations are true and provable that BP, or other oil industry
defendants with whom BP has “hold harmless” contracts, knowingly took
unreasonable risks that endangered personnel on the drilling platform and
caused the disastrous pollution of the Gulf,99 the first determination to be made
with respect to punitive damages under the framework established in Gore
would be the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.100 The
Gore Court explained the reprehensibility factor as reflecting the well-settled
notion “that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others.”101 The Court
has stated that the degree of reprehensibility is “[p]erhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.”102 Gore
enumerated several factors for lower courts to consider in determining the
degree of reprehensibility present in a particular case;103 the Court later
clarified these factors in Campbell.104 The five factors, as enumerated in
Campbell, are: (1) whether the conduct caused physical harm versus purely
economic harm; (2) “indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others;” (3) the financial vulnerability of the plaintiff; (4) repeated
instance of similar misconduct versus an isolated incident; and (5) whether
“the harm result[ed] from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit” as opposed to
a merely accidental happening.105 All five factors are rarely present in a single
case, so the reviewing court must apply the factors that are relevant to the
specific facts. Although the presence of multiple reprehensibility factors
makes sustaining the punitive damages award easier, one dominant factor can
be sufficient to sustain an award. In Campbell, however, Justice Kennedy
opined that “the absence of all of [the five factors] renders any [punitive
damages] award suspect.”106

98. See, e.g., id. at 294 (noting that the action would be premised on a manufacturing or
design defect); see also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico,
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2011).
99. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1419 (suggesting that the oil companies involved
engaged in “risky behavior” and did not adequately focus on protecting the environment and the
safety of their employees).
100. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
101. Id. at 575.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 576–77.
104. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing Gore, 517
U.S. at 576–77).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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It is possible that the Deepwater Horizon incident could give rise to the rare
case in which all five factors would apply.107 First, the oil companies’ conduct
inflicted enormous physical harm through death and injury to humans and
wildlife, likely causing long-term harm to regional ecosystems;108 their
conduct also caused monumental economic harm to the Gulf region.109
Second, defendants’ alleged relentless focus on speed and cost savings
manifested an indifference to the safety of their workers, the environment, and
the Gulf’s regional economy.110 Third, the fishing, seafood, and tourist
industries in the Gulf region are particularly vulnerable to oil pollution.
Fourth, BP’s safety record regarding its oil drilling, oil transport, and oil
refining activities is checkered at best.111 Their record arguably reflects a
pattern of placing profits above worker safety and environmental protection.112
The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe was not an isolated incident.113 As to the
fifth factor, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove deliberate deceit or
outright malice in the planning and mismanagement of the Deepwater
Horizon.114 Gross disregard for worker safety and severe damage to the
environment because of reckless haste, however, are certainly in the same class
of egregious conduct as the rapacious corporate practices condemned by the
Court in TXO.115 Taken together, there is a strong case for the proposition that
this catastrophe was not merely an innocent accident.
B. The Second Guidepost: Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory
Damages
The Deepwater Horizon disaster also warrants application of the second
Gore guidepost—the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.116
The numerical relationship between the amount of compensatory damages and

107. See id.; see also infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
108. Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1414.
109. Id. at 1415–16.
110. See id. at 1416 (noting a common perception that the oil companies involved “put
profits before safety”). But see REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L COMM. ON THE BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL
DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 125 (2011) (refusing to state explicitly
whether the oil spill was the result of cutting corners to save money).
111. Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater
Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 22–25 (2011).
112. Id. at 25.
113. Id. at 22–25.
114. See Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 1419 (noting that, although it is possible investigators
could ultimately find evidence of deliberate criminal conduct, the oil companies involved are
more likely to be held liable under a negligence standard).
115. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (sustaining a
jury’s large punitive damages award in light of the offending company’s “malicious and
fraudulent course [of action]”).
116. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).
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punitive damages is a significant consideration and is the most commonly cited
basis for determining the excessiveness of a punitive damages award.117 The
requirement of a reasonable relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages was constitutionalized in Gore,118 but the exact definition of what is
“reasonable” remains unsettled.119 The Court in Gore recognized the common
law preference for single-digit ratios120 but refused to adopt a mathematical
formula or other bright-line rule.121 The Court observed that consideration of
the ratio is fact-specific; although a larger disparity between punitive and
compensatory damages is subject to close scrutiny, the Court also recognized
the possibility that certain factual situations could warrant higher punitive
awards.122 The Court reaffirmed the fact-specific determination necessary to
calculate the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in Campbell.123 Other
pre-Gore decisions by the Court have stressed that the actual harm suffered by
the plaintiff is not the sole factor in determining the acceptable ratio.124
Several decisions have considered the relevance of other indices of
reasonableness, including the extent of the potential harm that could have
resulted.125 For example, had the Deepwater Horizon oil spill continued into
hurricane season, the impact of a Category four or five hurricane, combined
with millions of gallons of oil still pouring out of the uncapped well, could
have resulted in a much higher amount of harm.
117. Id. at 580–81.
118. Id. at 574 & n.22, 575, 580 (explaining that the Gore guidepost restrictions on the award
of punitive damages is grounded in the principle of fair notice of penalty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause).
119. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424 (2003) (qualifying its
application of the second Gore guidepost to factually specific determinations by stating, “we have
been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential
harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (expressing reluctance to establish bright-line limits to define the
reasonableness consideration).
120. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (expressing approval for punitive damage ratios of ten-to-one
or lower). Indeed, in England, statutes allow double, treble, and occasionally quadruple damages
awards to deter egregious wrongdoings. Id. at 580–81.
121. Id. at 582–83.
122. Id. at 581–82.
123. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
124. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (explaining
that “both State Supreme Courts and [this] Court have eschewed an approach that concentrates
entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive damages”).
125. See, e.g., Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (finding that it is “appropriate to
consider the reasonableness of punitive damages awards in light of the potential harm the
defendant’s conduct could have caused”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25 (referencing both actual
and potential harm in considering limits on the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages); TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (holding that “[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the
potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the
wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to the other victims that might have
resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred”).
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The amount of compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiffs injured by
the Deepwater Horizon incident will undoubtedly be very high.126 In
December 2012, BP pled guilty to federal criminal charges, including
manslaughter, and agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines.127 As of February 2013,
BP had paid out $24 billion in clean-up costs and payments to damaged
individuals, businesses, and local governments, reportedly setting aside an
additional $42 billion to cover future legal obligations relating to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster.128 The anticipation of a large compensatory
damages award could result in the equal expectation, according to the Court’s
decision in Campbell, of a limited punitive damages award.129 Indeed,
punitive damages could be limited to the amount of the compensatory damages
award, reflecting the one-to-one ratio established in Exxon.130 Conversely, the
Deepwater Horizon disaster could be the paradigm of the extraordinary case
that warrants higher punitive damages because of particularly egregious
harm.131 Similarly, even in the event of high compensatory damages, the
deterrent effect of punitive damages could justify a more disparate ratio,
especially if the history of the defendant’s oil exploration activities reveals
similar reckless conduct.132 The combination of a pattern of safety infractions
and the wealth of a defendant like BP could impact the applicability and effect

126. Press Release, British Petroleum, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for
Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010), available at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062966; see also Ilisja
Moreland, Comment, From the Exxon Valdez to the Deepwater Horizon: Will BP’s Dollar Reach
Where the Oil Didn’t?, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.J. 117, 128 (2011) (recognizing the extent of
BP’s potential liability).
127. Clifford Krauss, Battle Lines for the BP Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, at B8.
128. Id.
129. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial,
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of
the due process guarantee”).
130. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513, 515 (2008) (establishing a one-to-one
ratio in maritime cases). It is possible that this ratio could apply to the Deepwater Horizon
litigation, as a federal district court has determined that maritime law is applicable to the incident.
See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951, 962–63 (E.D.
La. 2011).
131. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (holding that the extent of
harm caused to the plaintiff, whether actual or potential, warrants a higher ratio). The idea of
particularly egregious harm warranting a higher punitive damages award is reminiscent of the
first Gore guidepost. See id. at 575 (finding that “some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others”).
132. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (explaining that
punishment and deterrence are part of the underlying rationale of punitive damages); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (recognizing the importance of imposing
a proper punitive damages award in order to deter misconduct).
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of deterrence in contemplating a larger punitive damages award.133 In
weighing the guideposts, a court could reasonably approve a high damages
ratio for the purpose of warning BP, and the entire oil industry, that higher
standards of safety and environmental protection are expected in the future.
C. The Third Guidepost: Comparability to Civil Sanctions
The third guidepost determines excessiveness of the punitive damages by
contemplating the penalties of analogous civil actions or criminal violations.134
It emphasizes the reasonableness of a punitive damages award when it is
comparable to similar unlawful misconduct.135 Although this rationale was
applicable in Gore, in which there was a sizeable disparity between the
$10,000 statutory fine and the original $4 million in punitive damages awarded
by the jury,136 subsequent cases have demonstrated that large differences
between punitive awards and civil fines are not unusual.137 The state’s interest
in punishing or deterring misconduct is not necessarily related to the policies
underlying statutory penalties.138 In practice, it is often difficult to identify and
interpret germane civil or criminal sanctions; increasingly, courts look to
inter-and intra-jurisdictional precedent for comparability guidance.139 In the
133. TXO, 509 U.S. at 463–64; see also Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive
Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 927, 928–29 (2008) (advocating for the use of a party’s wealth in
determining an appropriate punitive award).
134. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.
135. See id. (explaining that “a reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of
punitive damages is excessive should ‘accord substantial deference to legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue’” (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. Id. at 583–84.
137. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410, 418 (Utah
2004) (approving a $9 million punitive damages award even when the comparable statutory
penalty was only $10,000).
138. Colleen P. Murphy, Comparison to Criminal Sanctions in the Constitutional Review of
Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1443, 1460–61 (2004) (demonstrating how courts
have struggled in translating criminal penalties in the form of imprisonment to an appropriate
punitive award); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2002)
(distinguishing punitive damages from comparable criminal sanctions by explaining that
“[p]unitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a
criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award”); Murphy, supra, at
1450–51 (drawing a distinction between punitive damages and statutory penalties by explaining
the different legislative purposes and intent underlying statutory sanctions). The Court has
recognized the policy interests of criminal penalties, distinguishable from that of civil sanctions,
in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–100 (1997)
(recognizing a wholly separate legislative intent between civil and criminal penalties in the
context of double jeopardy).
139. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 246 P.2d 1121, 1130–31 (Or. 2011)
(finding no real comparable sanction and concluding that “the third guidepost [did] not play a
significant role”); Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 682 S.E.2d 877, 891–92 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009)
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case of Deepwater Horizon, a precedential approach could result in the
application of Exxon and other cases involving the oil industry.
The relative lack of utility of the third guidepost is reflected in the fact that
comparable penalties are generally considered only after the application of the
first two guideposts.140 Rather than simply drawing analogies between degree
of misconduct and similar sanctions, cases applying the third guidepost
struggle to interpret and apply penalties such as the disgorgement of profits,
loss of a relevant business license, or possible incarceration.141 In Campbell,
Justice Kennedy questioned the relevance of criminal sanctions, recognizing
the challenge of applying the different presumptions and higher burdens of
proof in criminal matters.142 If the third guidepost carried more weight,
uncertainty about which civil or criminal sanctions should be used as
comparisons might be of more concern; however, in many cases, the third
guidepost appears to offer little or no meaningful direction to lower courts.
Although the third guidepost is the least useful to reviewing courts in
evaluating claims of excessiveness, it may justify higher punitive damages
awards in the Deepwater Horizon calamity. The federal criminal penalty for
oil pollution is a steep fine ranging from $25,000 to $100,000 per day,143 plus
full responsibility for all of the costs of cleaning up the spill.144 In this case,
BP has already settled for $4.5 billion in federal criminal penalties.145 Other
civil fines and costs are estimated to total tens of billions of dollars.146 It may

(recognizing a pattern of difficulty in finding and applying comparable civil or criminal penalties
in South Carolina and upholding a punitive damages award based on the first two guideposts);
Carlton Energy Grp., LLC v. Phillips, 369 S.W.3d 433, 460–61 (Tex. App. 2012) (finding no
comparable penalties and basing the decision to sustain the punitive damages award on the first
two Gore guideposts).
140. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428 (questioning the relevancy and utility of the third Gore
guidepost in calculating punitive damages); see also Murphy, supra note 138, at 1444, 1461,
1464 (finding that many post-Campbell courts disregard the third guidepost and do not consider it
a dispositive cap on punitive damages); Solange E. Ritchie, The World After State Farm v.
Campbell; Punitive Damages: Past, Present and Future, 33 W. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 99–100
(2005-2006) (interpreting Campbell to consider the use of comparable criminal sanctions in
determining reprehensibility—the first Gore guidepost).
141. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428 (discussing the trial court’s analysis of possible criminal
penalties to calculate punitive awards).
142. Id.
143. See Robert Force et al., Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Civil
Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 957–60 (2011) (noting
that the penalty amount depends on whether the violation is found to be neglectful or knowing
and whether the incident is the perpetrator’s first or second violation).
144. Id. at 906–09. As of Spring 2012, “the federal government [had] proposed fines of
$45.7 million on BP, Transocean, and Halliburton for unsafe oil drilling practices.” Koenig
& Rustad, supra note 96, at 300.
145. Krauss, supra note 127, at B8.
146. Pierre Bertrand, BP Settles Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Lawsuit for $7.8 Billion,
Additional Fines Possible, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012, 3:23 PM),
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also be relevant that the Obama Administration reached an agreement with BP
under which the corporation established a $20 billion fund, administered by
former 9/11 fund administrator Ken Feinberg, to compensate firms and
individuals in the Gulf area who suffered damages from the Deepwater
Horizon disaster.147 Therefore, because of the well-established practice that
the third guidepost does not override liability under the other two guideposts,
but serves primarily as an independent benchmark for courts to consider in
evaluating the award, the prospect of potentially high civil and criminal
penalties appears to support a large punitive damages award, better suited to
the Deepwater Horizon incident than to run-of-the-mill industrial mishaps.
Also pointing toward large punitive damages is the tendency of courts to look
to intra- and inter-jurisdictional precedent to determine the excessiveness of a
particular punitive damages award.148 For example, Exxon, where the oil
company paid roughly $1.3 billion in civil and criminal penalties,149 also
supports a very high punitive damages award.
III. “MARCHING ORDERS” VERSUS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE DISCRETION:
LOWER COURTS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO HIGHER COURT DIRECTIONS ON REMAND
Rich literature exists on the issue of the discretion available to lower courts
in handling cases returned to them on remand from higher courts.150 Similarly,
many of these scholarly writings specifically address the responsibilities of
lower courts when cases are remanded for reconsideration in light of changes
in the governing law.151 However, important to this Article is the state courts’
handling on remand of a federally imposed constitutional analysis, which
involves the realm of traditional federalism sensitivities. When the Supreme
Court grants certiorari to a state case, this often initiates the Court’s Grant,
Vacate, and Remand (GVR) process—certiorari is granted, the lower court
decision is vacated, and the case is remanded to the state court for further

http://www.ibtimes.com/bp-settles-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-lawsuit-78-billion-additional-fines
-possible-419904.
147. Stephen Gidiere et al., The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA.
LAW. 374, 374 (2010).
148. See, e.g., Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1169–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002).
149. Moreland, supra note 126, at 119.
150. See, e.g., Michael A. Berch, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders
from Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 493 (2004);
Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court
Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 513–15 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GBRs—And an
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712 (2009); Sena Ku, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power:
Drawing a Line Between Deference and Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383–85 (2008); Shaun
P. Martin, Gaming the GVR, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 551–53 (2004).
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proceedings as directed by the Court.152 Supremacy concerns are periodically
raised as to whether the state court, on remand, followed the Supreme Court’s
instructions.153
Remands from appellate courts for further proceedings below do not usually
pose problems within state judicial systems or within the federal courts.
Through their supervision powers, state supreme courts have the inherent
capacity for dealing directly with non-responsive lower courts.154 The same
holds true of higher federal courts and remands to lower federal courts.
Remands within the federal system where jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship appear to cause few problems for state law development because
state courts are not bound by the federal courts’ decisions as precedent.155 It is
only the special case of challenged state supreme court decisions to which the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari, issued a ruling, and remanded the case
back to the state court for further proceedings that raises concerns about the
state courts’ response to federal constitutional law dictates.156
Scholarship devoted to this issue appears in periodic clusters in response to
particularly vexing supremacy issues. For example, one of the most sustained
flurries is found in response to Brown v. Board of Education and focuses on
the Supreme Court’s “with all deliberate speed”157 order.158 Other clusters can
be found in response to decisions regarding certain civil rights issues,159 death
penalty remands,160 sentencing guidelines,161 and, recently, punitive damages

152. See Martin, supra note 151, at 551–62 (providing a discussion of the Supreme Court’s
GVR process).
153. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 140(b) (stating, “[t]he Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction . . . to issue such remedial writs or orders as may be necessary to give it
general supervision and control of courts of inferior jurisdiction”); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 4
(declaring, “[t]he Supreme Court shall have general superintending control over all courts; power
to use, hear, and determining prerogative and remedial writs; and appellate jurisdiction as
provided by rule of the Supreme Court”); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (maintaining, “[t]he
Supreme Court shall have . . . appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings [except civil
actions for less than $200]”).
155. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938).
156. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
157. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
158. See, e.g., Berch, supra note 150, at 495–96; Jim Chen, With All Deliberate Speed:
Brown II and Desegregation’s Children, 24 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3–4 (2006); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies
and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 609–12 (1983); Robert B. McKay, “With All Deliberate
Speed”: A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); James. E. Pfander,
Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 24 LAW & INEQ. 47, 47–55 (2006).
159. Most mandated busing to facilitate school desegregation.
160. See, e.g., Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority:
Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994); Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction,
Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795,
811 (1983); Elise Borochoff, Comment, Lower Court Compliance with Supreme Court Remands,
24 TOURO L. REV. 849, 852–54 (2008).
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awards.162 In Campbell, the Utah Supreme Court provided some insight as to
how to interpret a remand from the Supreme Court.163 Justice Kennedy,
writing the majority opinion, opined that the “facts of this case . . . likely
would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of the
compensatory damages.”164 On remand, State Farm argued that this language
strictly mandated the Utah Supreme Court to reduce the punitive damages
After
award to an amount equal to the compensatory damages.165
acknowledging its responsibility as an inferior court to honor the Supreme
Court’s decisions with utmost fidelity, the Utah Supreme Court expressed
skepticism that its duties could “be reduced to an enumerated task list imposed
by a ‘mandate rule.’”166 The Utah Supreme Court explained that, if the federal
court had chosen to fix the maximum size of the punitive damages award, the
state court would have no choice but to order the reduction pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s ruling.167 As read by the Utah Supreme Court, the Campbell
opinion imposed no such mandate.168 Instead, the Utah Supreme Court
reasoned that the Supreme Court was following its customary practice and
entrusted the state court to calculate the precise punitive damages award that
met both the legitimate objectives of the state and due process demands.169
The Utah Supreme Court believed that, upon remand, the Supreme Court
intended to vest in the state courts the discretion to determine reasonable and
proportionate punitive damages awards.170 Applying the three guideposts and
expressly disagreeing with Justice Kennedy’s opinion on several key points,
including the appropriateness of a one-to-one ratio, the Utah Supreme Court
settled on a punitive damages award of over $9 million—greater than nine
times the compensatory damages.171
A similar issue arose upon remand to the Alabama Supreme Court in Gore,
in which the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it
was compelled to limit the punitive damages award to a ratio of less than four
161. Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, “Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”: Remands, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, & The Protect Act—A Radical “Departure”?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527,
527–28 (2004).
162. Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra note 150, at 514–15; Goldman & Levin, supra note
64, at 509–11; Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s Guide
to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L. REV. 367,
367–70 (1999); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that
Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 461–64 (2005).
163. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 411–12 (Utah 2004).
164. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
165. Campbell, 98 P.3d at 411.
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 412.
171. Id. at 420.
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times the compensatory damages.172 The Alabama Supreme Court ignored
Justice Stevens’ suggestion that a four-to-one ratio was most appropriate and
decided on a final punitive damages award of $50,000—twelve and one half
times the $4,000 compensatory damages award.173
It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize the literature on this
issue, but two themes commonly appear that are worth emphasizing. First, in
characterizing the behavior of lower courts on remand, as illustrated in
Campbell, much depends on the explicitness of the orders or the precision of
the instructions handed down by the higher court.174 Second, in the absence of
specific orders or precise instructions, a well-developed jurisprudence on
punitive damages awards has simply not emerged to guide lower courts
handling cases on remand. Scholars remark that the law in this area is “fluid”
and lacks guiding “neutral principles.”175 The few studies available on this
issue suggest a low incidence of lower courts scrupulously fulfilling the
decisional expectations of remanding courts.176 This study of recent punitive
damages decisions provides new insights into the lowers courts’ fealty to what
may or may not be perceived by them as “marching orders” issued by higher
courts.
The “remittitur” is a procedural option not available in all jurisdictions.177
Remittiturs strongly influence the rate at which disputed cases are remanded.178
In jurisdictions where remittiturs are customary, a reviewing court may adjust
punitive damages awards deemed unconstitutionally excessive and offer the
plaintiff the opportunity to accept a reduced award by remitting damages above
that level, or face a new trial on remand.179 Most plaintiffs choose to accept
the reduced award, thereby ending the litigation. Issues concerning whether or
not a lower court has properly performed its duties on remand mostly arise in
jurisdictions where remittitur is unavailable.
IV. THE STUDY AND ITS METHODOLOGY
In order to see whether the Justices’ concerns in Williams III were valid
regarding the lower court’s faithfulness to the Supreme Court’s punitive
damages jurisprudence, this Article examines the reported punitive damages
172. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (per curiam).
173. Id.
174. Borochoff, supra note 160, at 879.
175. Berch, supra note 150, at 508–09.
176. See, e.g., id. at 507–08.
177. Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation
with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. L. REV.157, 163–69 (1987-1988).
178. Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century
Origins of Remittitur and Its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299, 300 (2000).
179. Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299
(1976); see also Carlton Energy Grp., LLC v. Phillips, 369 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Tex. App. 2012)
(explaining the plaintiff’s decision to accept remittitur in lieu of a new trial).
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cases decided by lower state and federal courts since the 2003 Campbell
decision.180 The over 500 collected opinions were classified by the type of
plaintiff’s claim, which varied greatly from the type of economic harm at the
center of Gore and Campbell. The cases were classified into twelve different
types of claims based on the criterion that at least ten cases involving the
specific type of claim were required to justify a separate category.181 A
substantial number of cases did not meet the ten-case criterion and were
designated as “Other Cases.” The wide variety in the types of punitive
damages claims that fell into the “Other Cases” category accounted for nearly
ten percent of the cases reviewed.182 Surprisingly, there were only a small
handful of class action cases.
Each case was analyzed in view of the type of claim presented, the
implementation of each of the three guideposts, and the final outcome of the
case. Variations in the application of the guideposts were identified with
particular attention given to the relationship between the compensatory
damages and the punitive damages awarded. The cases were tracked through
several stages of appeals with attention given to the outcome and rationale at
each stage of the process.
The analysis examined how the guideposts were implemented by each court
and noted difficulties experienced by courts in applying each of the relevant
guideposts to the broad range of punitive damages claims in the study.
Statements by a lower court suggesting resistance to the guideposts were
specially noted. Resistance or hostility to applying the guideposts was found
to be rare; statements of frustration with the guideposts or signs of grudging
acceptance of the Supreme Court’s directions were also collected. This study
yielded a broad idea of how the new constitutional punitive damages regime
was implemented by lower courts, particularly noting signs of a lack of
faithfulness or reluctance to implement the due process guideposts.183

180. See generally Williams III Transcript, supra note 4. For a list of cases included in the
study, categorized by type of claim, see infra Appendix A.
181. The twelve claim types developed were: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) employment;
(3) fraud; (4) creditor abuse; (5) business torts; (6) insurance; (7) wrongful death and personal
injury; (8) privacy invasion; (9) product liability; (10) property damage; (11) civil rights
violations, other than Title VII; and (12) Title VII violations. See infra Appendix A.
182. Examples of punitive claims included in “Other Cases” were trespass to private
property, securities fraud, aggravated assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.
See generally infra Appendix A.
183. The review also looked beyond the “faithfulness” question to other problems that
presented themselves in the lower courts’ implementation of the guideposts, including difficulties
the lower courts were experiencing in performing their new responsibilities, specific issues for
which the guideposts were not working well, and where further refinement of the guideposts by
the Supreme Court or legislation could be beneficial. The results of this analysis are forthcoming
in a more comprehensive article.
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A. General Observations: Searching for Lack of Faithfulness
The study revealed that the type of modern cases awarding punitive damages
were much more varied than the two original cases yielding the guidepost
analysis. Consequently, the study required close scrutiny to determine whether
the “faithfulness” concern manifested itself in particular categories of cases.
The cases in which courts expressed any negative feelings toward the new
punitive damages jurisprudence were so rare that no discernible trend could be
identified with respect to specific types of cases.
The study also revealed a trend that most state courts treated the new
constitutional jurisprudence as supplemental to, and not a replacement for,
their existing state law governing punitive damages.184 For example, if state
law had developed its own multi-part test for determining the appropriateness
of punitive damages in a particular case, as most states had, later state court
opinions simply adjusted these existing standards to include the three Supreme
Court guideposts, or they applied the guideposts as a second level of review.185
A significant number of cases involving punitive damages were brought in
federal courts by plaintiffs who invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction. The
federal court decisions based on diversity appeared to discover and apply the
relevant state law on punitive damages, while carefully enforcing the evolving
constitutional jurisprudence.186
B. Overall Trends Show that Lower Courts Follow the Supreme Court’s
“Marching Orders”
To the extent that general trends could be observed over the ten years of
cases studied, most noticeable was that, as a body of local law developed, state
or federal courts within the jurisdiction applying the guideposts increasingly
referred to precedents established by earlier decisions, particularly in the
application of the third guidepost.
Based on the strong concerns expressed by several Supreme Court Justices
in oral argument during Williams III,187 one might expect, in a study of over
500 lower court opinions, to find considerable evidence of resistance or
reluctance to carry out the new constitutional “marching orders.” Instead, the
study found that the lower courts almost always invoked the new constitutional
doctrine correctly and dutifully proceeded to analyze the reasonableness and
size of the punitive damages award before them by applying the three
guideposts.188 Except for the three leading cases—Gore, Campbell, and
Williams II, where, on remand, the state supreme courts parted company with
184. See, e.g., James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 670–71 (S.C. 2006) (agreeing
with the lower courts’ additional use of the Gamble test).
185. Id.
186. See generally infra Appendix A.
187. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 42, 48.
188. See generally infra Appendix A.
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some aspect of the Supreme Court’s analysis,189—the strongest negativity
found in ten years of lower court opinions arose because of growing
dissatisfaction with Guidepost 3. Many courts noted the absence of a relevant
civil fine or other penalty for similar misconduct to use as a reference point for
the size of the punitive damages award being reviewed.190 A number of courts
questioned whether possible criminal sentences or administrative sanctions are
even relevant to the comparability analysis,191 and others simply skipped or
substantially downplayed Guidepost 3 in their due process analysis.192
Increasingly, lower courts appear to be converting Guidepost 3 into a search
for comparable litigation results in punitive damages cases in their own
jurisdiction.193 Some courts looked for decisions applying Guidepost 3 in
other jurisdictions that were relevant to the “fair notice” origins of this
substantive-due-process based review.194
The Montana Supreme Court’s analysis in Seltzer v. Morton195 exemplifies
the typical perspective of state courts considering a more general application of
the guideposts. In attempting to apply the guideposts to the facts of the
malicious prosecution case before them, the Montana Supreme Court first
stated, “we have come to appreciate the dissenting statements [in Gore and
Campbell] regarding the vague nature of the Gore guideposts,”196 but
continued on to hold: “Of course, we are nonetheless bound to follow federal
precedent here, and we have endeavored to do so meticulously.”197 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals penned similar reservations, saying that “[w]eighing
the guidepost factors as we must with their built-in imprecision and
indeterminateness, . . . we are unable to conclude that the punitive damages
award was excessive or was the result of passion and prejudice.”198 This
outlook is hardly an indication of a judicial rebellion.
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals commented that “determination
of the maximum constitutional amount of punitive damages is not easy or
189. See supra notes 8, 12–13 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 112 (9th Cir. 2008).
191. Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 671–72
(N.M. 2002) (noting that several courts that have taken issue with Guidepost 3).
192. See, e.g., Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 682 S.E.2d 877, 891–92 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(attempting to apply the third guidepost but noting that the state’s general product liability statute
“is of very little aid in [the] analysis because it does not fix civil fines”).
193. See, e.g., Morris v. Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (titling its
discussion of the third guidepost, “Disparity Between Punitive Damages and Civil Penalties in
Comparable Cases,” and then proceeding to cite a number of cases with similar landlord tenant
complaints that resulted in punitive damages, but not addressing any actual civil penalties from
the facts of the case).
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
195. 154 P.3d 561, 600 n.19 (Mont. 2007).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Muncey v. Eyeglass World, LLC, 289 P.3d 1255, 1274 (N.M. App. 2012).

402

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:371

exact” and that an appellate court, therefore, “must rely on [the panel’s]
combined experience and judgment.”199 Several other courts have observed
that this new regime of federal constitutional law is something for which the
Supreme Court has “mandated . . . ‘exacting’ de novo review,”200 and that
“[a]lthough . . . the punitive damages award was reasonable under [state law],
we must also review . . . under Gore.”201 Although these courts may be
expressing a modicum of unhappiness at having to undertake the extra level of
constitutional review, even this hint of reluctance is infrequent.
In recent state court decisions, the type of frustration with implementing the
guideposts that Judge W. Michael Gillette of the Oregon Supreme Court
expressed in his 2011 dissent is not common, but Judge Gillette may speak for
a number of lower court judges:
I add one final note: a plea to the Supreme Court of the United
States. For years this court generally, and I personally, have
struggled to apply Gore and Campbell faithfully to the cases before
us. This case represents but one of the many problems that have
cropped up in the seven years since the Court decided Campbell.
The courts around are in need of—indeed, I will assert that we
deserve—further guidance that only the Court can provide. Whether
the Court agrees with my analysis, or the majority, or something in
between, does not matter to me. But it would be a responsible act of
comity for the Court to say something clear to help in future cases.202
V. RECONCILING FAITHFULNESS FINDINGS WITH THE JUSTICES’ CONCERNS
Finding almost universal faithfulness on the part of lower courts in accepting
and applying the guideposts raises an interesting question: Given the
seriousness of the concerns expressed by three justices in the Williams III oral
arguments,203 why did the lower courts not express more reluctance to engage
in this additional layer of federally mandated judicial review?
One possible answer lies in the very limited nature of the issue under review
in Williams III, which elicited the concerns in the first place.204 Unlike other
punitive damages cases to reach the Supreme Court, the case involved the
narrowest of issues—the questionable phrasing of a single jury instruction.205
Even Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams II was somewhat unclear as
to whether the issue was a procedural irregularity or an error of substantive
199. Miller v. Faiz, No. G042917, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2721, at *21 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist. Apr. 13, 2011).
200. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 289 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2005).
201. James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (S.C. 2006).
202. Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 246 P.3d 1121, 1136 (Or. 2011) (Gillette, J.,
pro tempore, dissenting).
203. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
204. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 3.
205. Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 350 (2006).
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law.206 If the challenged instruction misstated the controlling constitutional
law concerning how juries are to calculate punitive damages awards, it would
conventionally require a substantive due process analysis. Justice Breyer,
however, characterized the problem as procedural.207 If the mistake was
substantive, and Oregon subsequently acknowledged a correct understanding
of the applicable constitutional law, as it did in subsequent cases,208 then this
flurry of concerns about lower court fidelity to Supreme Court precedent was
much ado about nothing.
Conversely, if the error was strictly procedural and Oregon may
constitutionally prescribe the method by which a defendant may preserve this
type of objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, then the Oregon
decision denying Philip Morris the opportunity for further review of the issue
was legitimate in light of the Supreme Court’s deference to the states on such
litigation decisions.209 If so, then perhaps the Justices’ reaction—interjecting
themselves so memorably during oral arguments to express concerns about the
Oregon court’s ruling, possibly encouraging noncompliance by other lower
courts—was perhaps an exaggerated reaction in the heat of the moment and
later regretted.210 Under either interpretation, the apparent conflict between the
Oregon Supreme Court’s insistence on following its own procedural rules and
the Supreme Court’s concern that its earlier ruling was not being followed
appears to lack a viable predicate.
The most likely explanation, however, is that the inference of possible
widespread unfaithfulness drawn from the Justices’ expressions of concern in
the Williams III oral arguments211 was nothing more than over-the-top
speculation without solid information about what was actually happening in
the great majority of lower courts. Punitive damages cases reach the U.S.
Supreme Court very infrequently, and it is even rarer that the Court finds a
constitutional error and remands to the state courts for corrective action.212
The dynamic of a state supreme court reacting to a remand from the Supreme
Court to reapply the guideposts is quite different from the ordinary review of
punitive damages awards in light of the guideposts within state or lower
federal court systems.
With the benefit of hindsight, projecting a
“faithfulness” problem from the Oregon Supreme Court’s reaction to the

206. Id. at 349–58.
207. Id. at 353.
208. See Schwartz v. Philip Morris Inc., 235 P.3d 668, 678 (Or. 2010) (approving the
corrected jury instructions).
209. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 449.
210. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
211. Williams III Transcript, supra note 4, at 46, 48.
212. Gash, supra note 32, at 527 (stating, “the Court is almost certainly entering an extended
silent phase in its punitive damages jurisprudence and will not be reviewing any punitive
damages awards for the foreseeable future”).
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remand in Williams II213 was probably unjustified, and the study confirms this
conclusion.
Interestingly, in nearly every opinion that the Supreme Court has issued
involving this new substantive due process analysis to detect excessive
punitive damages awards, the Court has made a point of acknowledging that,
under well-established principles of federalism within the broad constitutional
boundaries laid out in Gore214 and Campbell,215 it is the state’s primary
responsibility to make the ultimate decision regarding the best way to protect
the state’s interest through the awarding of punitive damages to produce
retribution and deterrence of wrongful conduct. Thus, the constitutional
doctrine that underlies these interactions between the Supreme Court and state
supreme courts contemplates granting a great deal of independence and
discretion to the state courts in determining the need for punitive damages and
fixing the appropriate size of the award in a particular case. This federalism
dynamic is less prevalent in higher state courts that review lower state courts’
punitive damages awards, or federal courts of appeal reviewing district courts’
diversity actions for punitive damages awards, thereby further diminishing the
likelihood of “unfaithfulness.”
Another possible answer to the absence of support for the “unfaithfulness”
hypothesis in the lower court decisions lies in the ready availability of the
remittitur device in most jurisdictions. When the reviewing court has the
option of offering the winning defendant a remitter of the excessive punitive
damages award or a new trial, there are fewer remands to the lower courts, and,
therefore, fewer occasions for the court to whom the remand is addressed to
disagree with the remanding court or complain about reapplying the guideposts
as directed by the superior court.
VI. CONCLUSION
However its near total absence is explained, the “unfaithfulness” concern
raised in the oral arguments in Williams III simply cannot be substantiated as a
significant factor in the over 500 punitive damages cases studied. To the
contrary, except in the handful of high profile Supreme Court cases in which
inconsistency can be clearly observed between the Supreme Court’s “marching
orders” in the remand and the state court’s subsequent disposition of the case,
there is virtually no evidence of a lack of fidelity by lower courts to the
constitutional guideposts governing review of punitive damages awards.
Further, beyond widespread frustration with Guidepost 3, there are almost no
signs of resistance or reluctance to applying the guideposts as promulgated by
the Supreme Court.216 Lower state and federal courts appear to be making
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.B.
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conscientious efforts to honor the guideposts, interpret them reasonably, and
apply them in the spirit in which they were promulgated.
It is certainly true, however, that not all lower courts are consistent in the
way they interpret and apply the guideposts, but the differences are not based
on resistance to the obligation to carry out their constitutional duties.217
Rather, lower courts reach different results in similar cases after carefully
parsing the holdings and dicta found in the key Supreme Court opinions to find
respectable rationales for decision, based on the peculiar facts of a case. This
remains consistent with the Supreme Court’s expectations and is readily
observable across the full spectrum of judicial decisions at both the state and
federal levels.218
This is not to deny that there exist a number of perplexing problems that
bubble to the surface when lower courts attempt to apply the guideposts in the
manner they think the Supreme Court expects. These are the issues that will
form the core of the second phase of this research project in which the same
ten years of cases will be analyzed to determine how well the guideposts are
working in practice to achieve the purposes for which the Supreme Court
created them. To the extent certain aspects of the guideposts appear to be
causing lower courts problems, analysis will be applied to offer suggestions
about how the guideposts might be improved to make them more effective
tools for correcting excessiveness in punitive damages awards. This larger and
more important project will be reported in a forthcoming article co-authored
with Professor Laura J. Hines of the University of Kansas School of Law.

217. Cf. supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part IV; see also generally infra Appendix A (providing a list of the cases
reviewed, categorized by type of claim).
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